Thanks for the kind comments - and an explanation!

The trio of articles on the XB-70 Valkyrie has produced a number of very fine responses in the XB-70 Facebook page that warrant a reply, but would definitely take things off topic in that area – hence placing things here!

Background…

Some of you may or may not be aware that I’ve been messing around in the historical aviation sphere here in the UK since I was a teenager. I’m one of the founders of a certain aviation museum called Duxford in Cambridgeshire, was engineering director of the East Anglian Aviation Society (EAAS) – we owned and restored to fly an old De Havilland Rapide biplane – and have been a long-time supporter of the Shuttleworth Collection at Old Warden. 2015 will see our 30^th consecutive year of trading at their summer airshows and I’m proud to say in that time we have not missed a single display day!

            I’m one of the very lucky few who has managed to translate and interest into a hobby, into a job and that has only been possible with having a VERY supportive wife!

           

  I went ‘full time’ as a researcher and author back in 1986, having been through the hell of power politics, lies, envy, jealousy and other assorted wonderful pleasures that the historic aviation field is prone to go through – if it was just ‘handbags at dawn’ it would be livable with – but at one stage there were allegations of fraud and theft aimed at me and my wife and a good friend of mine actually spent a night in police cells after fraud allegations were made at him! Doing my own thing and not aligning with any others meant that I had a better chance of controlling my own destiny as it were!

This ‘non-alignment’ over the years has been something of a double-edged sword – it has kept me clean from any commercial tainting (I know of at least one UK author who was covertly in the employ of one American aircraft manufacturer’s Public Relations Department and who used to write negatively-slanted articles on other aircraft manufacturers under the guise of being historically ‘correct’) – but has made things harder to research.

           

Having gained a lot of experience since 1970, I had by this point a set of standards in place that I would apply – ‘standards’ that over the years have gotten me in all sorts of trouble with others! The best way to describe these standards and how I apply them, is to look at how I put together one book – Memphis Belle – Dispelling the Myths.

Setting and maintaining a standard…

The Belle is and was probably the most famous Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress of them all.  Everyone thought they knew the story – and were happy with what they knew. It was the most written about, the most photographed – and the one with the most garbage published about this aircraft and crew.

           

  I found myself creating lists. Lists of books, magazine articles, newspapers, TV programmes and videos about the 91st Bomb Group in general and the Memphis Belle and her crew in particular that recorded all the errors I had discovered in each piece of work. Then I card-indexed, then computerised. Patterns emerged - I could trace back ‘errors’, and see how they got repeated. However, this was ‘negative’ non-productive work. If I could catalogue others ‘mistakes’ I could use the same process to catalogue what I knew.

           

  There was only one course of action to take - to look at the whole Memphis Belle story as if I was conducting an archeological ‘dig’ - ignore all that had been written before and go back to look at as much primary source documentation and contemporary images as could be located, then use that material as a benchmark to peel back the layers of legends, myths, mis-quotes and piles of ‘Public Relations propaganda’ in an attempt to discover what really happened. I had to become part detective, part archeologist and part photographic interpreter as well as being an historian and author - then, and only then could I try to set the record straight and also place the Memphis Belle story into the wider historical context with as little as possible of our own personal opinions included in the document.

The Belle book was the result of about 30 years of archiving material – I think many envision my archives as being neat lines of shelves of material, slowly gathering dust – nothing could be further from the truth.  My archive system is on the Hemerhoidic principal.

            

The ‘primary source documentation’ used as the foundation was a number of official documents. First and foremost is the Memphis Belle’s original Maintenance Inspection Record - the Air Corps Form 41-B. Then there are the individual daily logs of the four Bomb Squadrons that went to make up the 91st Bombardment Group - and that Group’s daily log. It was the task of officers designated from each Squadron and a representative from the Group to ensure that these logs were completed on a day-to-day basis to maintain the highest degree of accuracy possible by recording events as they happened.

           

  The other record is the daily Operations Record Book - known as the ‘ORB Form 540’ - for RAF Bassingbourn, also kept by a designated officer, this time a representative of the Royal Air Force. Last and by no means least is Robert Morgan’s own Individual Flight Record as completed and certified monthly on War Department Air Force Form 5.

           

The Daily Logs themselves almost caused an insurmountable problem. The 91st Bomb Group Association has a transcription of the 324th Bomb Squadron log for the period the Memphis Belle was with the unit. Unfortunately, for whatever reason there were some missions ‘missing’ from this transcription. The 20th December 1942 mission and the 5th April through to the 17th April missions are simply not there. Luckily I had copied the 324th BS log-book and all the other documents relating to the 91st BG back in the 1980s when these details were present and so I have a complete set of files.

            

I was well aware that there existed the possibility that there could be errors in these contemporary primary source records. However, if one or more record matches with the item in question then I knew that by making use of this cross-checking that the likelihood of an error is remote. I had to draw a line in the sand somewhere and use something as a baseline -  that baseline was and is the correlated contemporary official records. No doubt there are people out there who will say the official records are wrong and will claim that we have got this wrong and we have got that wrong because ‘...this book published in 1984 says this’ and ‘...this book published in 1998 says that’. To those people, after all the research I had conducted, I say this - prove it to me with matching contemporary primary source documentation and I will joyfully correct the historical record. However, just to tell us ‘...we are wrong’ with no contemporary proof to back up your point, is simply not good enough!

            

Then there are the photographs. The Memphis Belle was probably the most-photographed aircraft of the Second World War and I located hundreds of them! I freely admit that some are not of the best quality - yes, some are fifth or sixth generation copies, but all have provided vital information. Luckily, in some cases I discovered the original negatives. For the rest, slowly I worked back to obtain the earliest generation copies available, for there lies the best clarity and therefore the best possible way of extracting information. Often though, it is not the main subject of the picture that is of interest, but the fine detail of what is going on in the background. So we have reproduced images in profusion and of a sufficient size to aid clarity - and therefore prove our point!

            

The biggest difficulty I faced was to establish an accurate timeline as to events. In many cases two dates to a single event have been discovered. In some cases there are multiple dates. If it has been possible to determine exactly the date - this has been used. If doubt remains, then all information has been quoted. The same practice applies to spellings - many names have been spelt a number of different ways. Where known, the correct way is used. I also discovered - and cross-correlated to my own satisfaction - at least one major event where the official record and some photographs have been deliberately ‘amended’ to reflect events in a different time frame to what really happened!

          

  That ‘methodology’ is how I have always worked.  I did it with my first paperback book on the Rapide for Ian Allan Ltd, I did it with my first hardback book on the Mosquito for Arms & Armour Press. I apply these standards for my own publishing company, and I apply the same for my ongoing titles for Pen & Sword. I never speculate in the main body of the book – I always keep that for a chapter towards the end where I think the author is allowed to express his views and opinions in a separate area so the reader is very clear as to what they are reading. If there are contradictions, I explain them, if I do not know the answer to something, then I admit it – and if I get something wrong I’ll do everything in my power to correct it as soon as I possibly can!

In the context of the Memphis Belle, the final product of my labours was a 536 page hardback book. 

Some people raved over it – others called it ‘a load of tosh’ to quote one reviewer. This often happens – any author that writes and publishes something is akin to putting your head above the parapet and having your teeth kicked in – it goes with the territory I’m afraid. The book annoyed and upset a lot of people – mainly, I think because in putting it together I punctured their ‘comfort bubble’ as to what they thought they knew – many could or would not accept that.

Another huge aspect of what I do is our Airfield Focus series of books. Way back in 1992 John Hamlin, Aldon Ferguson and myself met up to discuss the possibility of my publishing company producing a series of booklets, each one looking at the history of a particular airfield. They came up with a good sales pitch to present to a publisher - a 24 page booklet, similar to the old aircraft ‘Profile’ series containing much more information that the little ‘thumbnails’ as contained in ‘Action Stations’ but at the same time way cheaper than the specialist hardback airfield histories. I bought into it, and ‘Airfield Focus’ series was born!

We’ve produced over a hundred now – and no matter which one we do, it’s never the right one, with some people complaining most vociferously. My usual method of dealing with it is to call their bluff and say if you want a title on a particular airfield doing, why don’t you write it? This often works, but it has generated some ‘interesting’ incidents.

We had one ‘author’ who was doing a Focus on a particular airfield for well over two years – now when I do one, I can put it together in about eight weeks, but not this guy. After a year, I chased him up…. No, not yet finished. After two years, still not complete. 30 months…. Ah… yes, well… we was burgled he had, and the burgler took the manuscript….. yeah… sure… right!

Ho Hum! Life is full of fun and games!

Revelations into the AV-2 XB-70 accident - 3

Escape Capsules – B-58 vs XB-70

It is now time to consider Mr Burton’s comments about Maj Carl Cross and the Escape Capsules.

Quote: ‘During a debriefing at the EAFB hospital, Al explained that he had encapsulated and was set to eject when he looked over to see that Cross was not properly preparing for ejection. He was pushing on the panel trying to force his seat back into the capsule which was the correct procedure in a B‑58 which Cross had been flying prior to his assignment to the XB‑70A. Al said that he opened his capsule and was trying to show Cross what to do when the ship went out of control. Al had no choice but to eject. However, he did it so fast that he failed to got his right arm back inside the capsule. As a result, his right elbow was injured during ejection. We couldn't believe that Major Cross hadn't learned the ejection process. We went to the seat ejection simulator where all XB‑70A Pilots were supposed to spend so many hours a week (I can't recall how many) practicing seat ejection. According to the log book, Major Cross had initialed the required practice time. However, the simulation crew told us that he never got in the seat ‑ he just came, initialed the log book, and left.’ Unquote.

The inference from Mr Burton is that Major Cross was sufficiently confident that the two escape capsules – as fitted to the B-58 and the XB-70 – were so similar in their design and use that he felt he required no further training. Hence the ‘….the simulation crew told us that he never got in the seat ‑ he just came, initialed the log book, and left…’

So, just how similar WERE they?

First, some background history to put things into context. America's first supersonic bomber, the B-58A Hustler built by Convair in Fort Worth, Texas, posed survivability problem for the crews that flew it if there was a need to eject. Early production and test aircraft were equipped with upward ejection seats, one for each of the crew members.

Side-mounted headrest panels helped hold the crewman's head steady so windblasts would not toss the head about too wildly. Straps attached to hands and feet automatically tightened on ejection to minimize arm and leg flailing. These helped, but were not much protection at Mach 2. More was needed.

The solution to the problem came from Stanley Aviation Company of Denver, Colorado. Stanley and Convair developed the fully enclosed crew capsule, a folding egg-shell-like system to replace conventional ejection seats. The capsules fitted into the standard ejection rails as did the seats. All B-58's ( except the two-pilot TB-58 models used to train and evaluate pilots ) were eventually upgraded with capsules.

The capsules greatly improved both crew safety and comfort. During normal flight the capsule remained open, permitting crew members access to their equipment. Lap, chest and shoulder straps to restrain crewmen during flight were built right into the capsule.

.

The capsule was a self-contained survival kit too. It included a host of equipment needed on land or at sea to sustain life and enable crewmen to exist in their compact enclosures. Capsules were fitted with flotation devices, much like small inner tubes, at each of the four corners. It theoretically would float right side up, with the crewman semi-reclined. A snorkle tube permitted air to enter with a ball-valve to keep water out.

Two occasions typically called for enclosing the capsule. In flight the capsule provided a moderately safe cocoon when cabin pressure failed or smoke filled the cockpit, including oxygen mask hookup. The vacuum tube avionics system was prone to overheating and putting smoke and fumes into the cockpit.

The B-58 escape pod

Safe ejection could be expected throughout a wide range of airspeed and altitude conditions. Only extremely high speeds posed ejection risk, or very low speeds at low altitudes. The system was not a zero-zero one permitting safe ejection on the runway.

The primary reason for capsule closure was bailout. The capsule closed downwards quickly when the trigger handles were activated by crewmen. Each independently controlled his own capsule. The closure sequence included automatic restraint and positioning of the user. Shoulder straps tightened and pulled the crewmen back. A bar passing laterally under the legs raised the knees and then pulled heels back against the seat pan. An upright fetal position was needed to assure capsule door clearance.

The pilot's capsule featured a window large enough to permit seeing the primary flight instruments. The flight control stick also fitted within the capsule, enabling limited control of the aircraft. The stick-mounted trim buttons and other switches afforded some control to allow aircraft descent.

A capsule closed in flight could be opened, with some difficulty, if flight was continued and bailout not imminent. Doors could be unlatched with levers located near your toes. Reaching those latches was not easy.

Squeezing the ejection trigger handles caused the overhead canopy to separate from the aircraft, followed quickly by the rocket-fired upward blasted capsule. As soon as the capsule cleared the aircraft, a drogue stabilizing parachute kept the system oriented properly. The main parachute deployed automatically at the appropriate altitude on descent. Normal landing attitude placed the crewman on his back at impact. That helped distribute the shock.

Clearly this is a very different capsule from the one fitted to the XB-70.  Crew restraints were different, the operating and triggering mechanisms were different, and the closure mechanisms was totally different. The B-58 capsule had segments that closed from the top down – the XB-70 device closed with a pair of clamshell doors that came from above and below to meet in the middle.

Therefore it is very strange that, given the complexity of the technology of the escape capsules and the differences in the two designs, nevertheless according to Mr Burton, Major Cross ignored the seat ejection simulator.

I would also ask if this was the case as Burton states, why did the simulation crew let him ‘…never got in the seat ‑ he just came, initialed the log book, and left...?’ Why was this obviously incorrectly followed procedure not reported and stopped?

But that is by no means the last query I have with Mr Burton’s  statements. As I have already mentioned elsewhere in this series of articles, Mr Burton states that ‘…Twice Al was heard telling Joe Walker to “get off my #@*# wing!”’. As I have shown elsewhere, there appears to be no record on any of the surviving transcripts of this having been spoken.  This, however, is not the only problem I have with this statement – I would ask - how did he know that Joe Walker was close to the wing of the XB-70?

Even with the seat in the forward position, lateral sightlines are severely restricted: if the view dead ahead is classed as being at zero degrees, then the view either side of this centerline is 90 degrees in either direction at the very maximum. Given that Al White was sitting in the left hand, or Captains seat position, his view out to the right hand side of the aircraft – where Joe Walker was flying the F-104N - would be even more restricted because he would be looking over and past the copilot and his escape capsule.

I’ve sat on the flight-deck of the surviving XB-70, and it is impossible to see any of the wing structure from either seat, even looking out of the side window on the side you are sitting!

The Captain's seat

So, that is a look in detail at what Mr Burton said just about the XB-70. I have not even considered any of the other aspects he covered in his original piece.

When looked at overall, certainly Mr Burton’s piece raises many more questions than is first appears to answer – although it does seem to raise new information as to what happened.

I am not making out I have any answers to the questions Mr Burton’s piece raises – all I have been able to do, is compare what Mr Burton says with primary source documentation on the XB-70, B-58 and the Accident Report to AV-2.

It’s very tempting to speculate answers to the questions Burton’s piece raises – this I refuse to do. I will say this however, Burton’s piece has the feel of the truth, but without further primary source documentation, I think answers must remain unanswered.

Revelations into the AV-2 XB-70 accident - 2

A Warning Of Flying To Close?

Further to my blog on the piece from the late Gene Earl Burton and has a URL of http://www.skypark.org/aero_memories/Gene_Burton.html. 

The main paragraph under discussion in both the earlier piece and in this article is this:

‘Then, in June of 1966 we were instructed by the Air Force to do a photo ops for the General Electric Company in which other planes that use GE engines would join in behind the XB‑70A (ship #2) for some in‑flight pictures that GE would use to help sell Lear Jets. At first, Al White refused to fly the mission because of the danger involved. In a low­ altitude, low‑speed flight configuration, the XB‑70A was very unstable ‑ like trying to drive a race car in city traffic. When the Air Force insisted, Al went along but he was in a very bad mood, as attested to his bad language during the photo ops maneuvering. Al’s copilot was Major Carl Cross, making his first flight in the XB‑70A. As the smaller planes began to form up on the XB‑70A, the plane that was to fly on the XB‑70A's right wing tip was an F‑104 Starfighter flown by astronaut Joe Walker. At that time, Joe held the world's altitude flying record and was a great test pilot as well as the chief umpire for the Monte Vista Little League, where I was President. Twice Al was heard telling Joe Walker to “get off my #@*# wing!” Suddenly, Joe got caught in an up‑draft under the XB‑70A's right wing tip. The F‑104 rolled up and over the top Of the XB‑70A, damaging one of the ship's vertical stabilizers. The Starfighter cartwheeled and exploded. Colonel Cotton, flying in a T‑38, radioed, "Midair! Midair!" Next, Cotton was telling the XB‑70A crew, “O.K., it looks like your tail is gone. You'll probably spin ... Bail out!" The ship did spin and cartwheel for 25,000 feet before it crashed am the desert floor. Al White's capsule ejected, but its inflatable bottom cushion didn't open, and Al's back was badly damaged when the capsule landed in a pile of rocks. Major Cross never got out of the plane. During a debriefing at the EAFB hospital, Al explained that he had encapsulated and was set to eject when he looked over to see that Cross was not properly preparing for ejection. He was pushing on the panel trying to force his seat back into the capsule which was the correct procedure in a B‑58 which Cross had been flying prior to his assignment to the XB‑70A. Al said that he opened his capsule and was trying to show Cross what to do when the ship went out of control. Al had no choice but to eject. However, he did it so fast that he failed to got his right arm back inside the capsule. As a result, his right elbow was injured during ejection. We couldn't believe that Major Cross hadn't learned the ejection process. We went to the seat ejection simulator where all XB‑70A Pilots were supposed to spend so many hours a week (I can't recall how many) practicing seat ejection. According to the log book, Major Cross had initialed the required practice time. However, the simulation crew told us that he never got in the seat ‑ he just came, initialed the log book, and left. That deception cost him his life. In all, the crash took two lives and caused injuries that ended the career of another. I didn't know Major Cross that well, but Joe Walker was a good friend, and I miss him even to this day.

After looking at the Seat Ejection Simulator aspect in the first article, another item I started to question is this statement ‘…Twice Al was heard telling Joe Walker to “get off my #@*# wing!”…’

I have a copy of the transcripts of Air-To-Ground and Interphone communications recorded of the last flight of 62-0207 as contained in the official accident report. I used extracts of these transcripts in my Pen & Sword book  ‘Valkyrie The North American XB70’.

Given Mr Burton’s statement, I went back to the transcipts and looked again more closely. The preamble to the transcripts states that call-signs of the aircraft participants in the formation flight are given, and that the transcript  includes only VHF communications and available interphone conversations that took place in the XB-70.

TO MY KNOWLEDGE THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THIS TRANSCRIPT HAS APPEARED IN FULL TO THIS POINT.

At the start of the transcript the formation was described, along with the crews and call-signs, working from left to right.

 T-38                         ‘601’                         Pilot: Capt Hoag, Copilot: Col Cotton

 F-4B                        ‘Bartender 97’           Pilot: Cmdr Skyrud, OBS: AT1 Black

XB70A                      ‘207’                        Pilot: Mr White, Copilot: Maj Cross

F-104N                     ‘813’                         Pilot: Mr Walker

F-5A                        ‘989’                           Pilot: Mr Fritz

Although not listed, off to the left of the formation was the Gates Lear Jet containing photographers.

All times states are PDST.

0908:54.

INTERPHONE. (WHITE): Do you want to fly? (CROSS): Say again? (WHITE): Do you want to fly? (CROSS): Affirm. I have it.

This establishes one very important fact – Maj Cross was the one who was flying the XB-70 from this point on.

0909:31           

DATA CONTROL: Two Zero Seven what is your total fuel? (207 – CROSS):Eighty point Five. DATA CONTROL: Roger.

0909:54

INTERPHONE: (Garbled and intermittent conversation up to and immediately before the next sequence).

0912:13

DATA CONTROL: Two Zero Seven may I have your Tank One and Tank Eight quantity please?

0912:28

(207 – CROSS): Tank – Tank One is seventeen point two. Eight left is seven point one. Eight right is nine point zero. (DATA CONTROL): Roger, thank you.

0912:38

(207 – WHITE): Hey, Frank, how about going to long interval here? I’m down to fifteen percent on the digital. (DATA CONTROL): Rogg. Go ahead. (207 – WHITE): Yes.

0912:58

(989): Data Control Nine Eight Nine. (DATA CONTROL): Go Ahead Nine Eight Nine.  (989) You might ask the Learjet if they’ve ah, had enough yet. Ah,  I think we’ve given them as much as they expected. Would you mind checking that? (DATA CONTROL): Nine Eight Nine, the Learjet said they’re still taking pictures and they’ll let us know when they are through. (989) Data, Nine Eight Nine was unable on that one. (601 – COTTON): John, he ah, this is Joe. He said – I heard him say ah, is back their still doing some good and he wants about fifteen more minutes if possible.

0913:34

(989) This is Nine Eight Nine. Roger, why don’t we have a fuel check and confirmation from the formation members? Start with Bartender Nine Seven.

0913:45

(BARTENDER 97): This is Bartender Nine Seven. I’ve still got forty minutes. (989) Ah, Roger, you’re OK for fifteen minutes more and return to Mugu? (BARTENDER 97): Nine Seven Affirm. (989) Rog. (989) Nine Eight Nine’s OK. (813) Eight One Three likewise. (601 – HOAG) Six oh one is fat.

0914:08

(DATA CONTROL): Two Zero Seven’s OK.

0914:12

(601 – COTTON): How’s Tank Five Carl? Did it stop at nine point zero? (INTERPHONE – CROSS) I’ll check on it in just a minute. (INTERPHONE – WHITE): Maybe you better go up in a bit. (INTERPHONE – CROSS) I’ll check this fuel if you want to take it a minute Al.

0914:25

(207 – WHITE): We’re going to have to climb a little bit, I guess – either that or everybody prop your card up on – the cowl there.

0915:10

(207 – CROSS): Eight’s feeding in normal sequence.

0915:24

(UNIDENTIFIED): Edwards Approach Control, ah…

0917:25

(carrier keyed)

0918:20

(207 – UNIDENTIFIED): -, do you want to fly?

0918:24

(207 – WHITE): Turning left.

Although not proven by the transcripts, the fact that White says ‘turning left’ suggests that he was the pilot now flying the XB-70.

0920:02:            

(DATA CONTROL): Ah, yes, this is Data Control. Is tank eight feeding now? (207 - Cross): Affirmative tank eight is feeding properly now. (DATA CONTROL): Rog.

0921:24            

(INTERPHONE - CROSS): They must have had that Learjet full of film or they'd be out of business by now. (INTERPHONE – WHITE ): Yes—He was sitting there but he's up here now. This hole is getting smaller and smaller too.

0922:47            

813 - WALKER): We must be helping the cumulus activity along with all this hot air. (207 – WHITE): Yes. (UNIDENTIFED) Yes. (UNIDENTIFID): Thank you.

0924:48            

RAPCON: Two zero seven. Traffic. Two zero miles east of your position, orbiting Three Sisters two four zero, two seven zero. (207 – WHITE): Roger, Thank you.

0925:05            

(207 – WHITE): We got a contrail out there—but, I don't ah, it looks like he's higher than that. (INTERPHONE - CROSS): Probably—

0925:23            

(601 – COTTON) Learsjets Lear – another four minutes the Learjet said. (207 - WHITE): Thanks, Joe.

0925:40

(UNIDENTIFIED): (two carriers keyed simultaneously)

0925:42            

(DATA CONTROL): Two zero seven, the Learjet says about three more minutes. (207 – WHITE): OK, Zeke.

09:26:06            

(RAPCON): Two zero seven, he's off your left wing now ah, below the clouds. (207 – WHITE):Roger, thank you. (RAPCON): The B-58's speed run is now one five miles east of your position westbound three zero  zero or above. (207 – WHITE):I have him, thank you.

09:26:26

(UNIDENTIFIED): At this time there was one carrier burst followed by a longer carrier, of one second maximum duration, sounding like a live microphone in an open cockpit.

09:26:28

(UNIDENTIFIED): There were two or more carriers on the frequency with resultant signal clash, followed by

(601 - HOAG): Mid-air, mid-air, stand by for— (601 - COTTON): You got the verticals, this is Cotton, you got the verticals—came off left and right. We're staying with ya, no sweat, now you're holding good, Al.

This is approximately three pages of transcript. There is no redactions shown, and no signs of any ‘page cuts’.  As can be seen, there is no sign anywhere of Mr Burton’s statement that Al White warned Joe Walker in the F-104  to stay away from the XB-70’s wing

What is not known is if there was a further discreet frequency or radio channel in use for aircraft – to – aircraft communications. If there was, it is not shown in the transcripts.

Revelation into the AV-2 XB-70 accident

REVELATIONS REGARDING 

MAJOR CARL SPENCER CROSS

AND THE NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION XB-70.

AIR VEHICLE #2 62-207

Graham M Simons

author,

‘Valkyrie The North American XB70’

Pen & Sword Aviation ISBN 184884546-4

Background.

In early 2015 an item appeared in the Rosamond Skypark Association webpage on the Internet. The Rosamond Skypark is a privately-owned and operated residential skypark located in Southern California's Antelope Valley (AKA ‘Aerospace Valley’). Their FAA designator is L00 (Lima-Zero-Zero) and their airport is open for public use.

One item was of particular interest and was brought to the attention of members of the XB-70 Valkyrie Facebook page, of which I am a member. The page in question was from the late Gene Earl Burton and has a URL of http://www.skypark.org/aero_memories/Gene_Burton.html. 

I found of great interest. Burton, worked for North American Aviation for 26 years, including on the XB-70. Quote: Routine flights were to be conducted out Of Air Force Plant #42 at Palmdale, California, while more dangerous or secret testing was to be done at nearby Edwards Air Force Base, California… In late 1959, I was transferred to the desert area and promoted to Flight Test Supervisor. We bought a home in Lancaster, California, the nicest place to live in a area. [sic]

The relevant part of the Gene Earl Burton transcipt regarding Major Carl Spencer Cross and the XB-70 accident is as follows. ‘During a debriefing at the EAFB hospital, Al explained that he had encapsulated and was set to eject when he looked over to see that Cross was not properly preparing for ejection. He was pushing on the panel trying to force his seat back into the capsule which was the correct procedure in a B 58 which Cross had been flying prior to his assignment to the XB 70A. Al said that he opened his capsule and was trying to show Cross what to do when the ship went out of control. Al had no choice but to eject. However, he did it so fast that he failed to got his right arm back inside the capsule. As a result, his right elbow was injured during ejection. We couldn't believe that Major Cross hadn't learned the ejection process. We went to the seat ejection simulator where all XB 70A Pilots were supposed to spend so many hours a week (I can't recall how many) practicing seat ejection. According to the log book, Major Cross had initialed the required practice time. However, the simulation crew told us that he never got in the seat   he just came, initialed the log book, and left’.

This raises several points, but please let me say from the outset, I am not doubting in the slightest that Gene Burton was there and recalled the events in the manner in which he describes them.  However, from the historical point of view the Rosamund Skypark web-page cannot be classed as ‘primary source documentation’. As their webmaster states ; ‘I may have missed a few scan-and-convert errors but otherwise it is presented exactly as received, including the personal introduction addressed to his family’.

This statement clearly shows that the original document was hard-copy typed, was then scanned into a computer and then converted to a file that was suitable for use on a web-page. Therefore what we are reading is almost certainly fourth generation from original author. The timeline is something like this:

1. Gene Burton tells story/writes it down.

2. Maybe types it, maybe has it typed for him

3. Original typed document scanned into computer

4. Scanned document converted to text file and ‘corrected’ by Rosamund webmaster.

5. Uploaded to web, the document we are reading.

From the webpage there are a number of obvious and even more not-so-obvious errors and it is possible that some or all of these were introduced at any stage during the timeline. Mr Burton may have remembered things incorrectly, there were typed errors introduced in the original hard copy, scanning errors were created when scanned, auto-correct errors appeared when converted to text file, the transcription was done by someone without technical knowledge – the possibilities are almost endless.

Mr Burton states: ‘…We went to the seat ejection simulator where all XB 70A Pilots were supposed to spend so many hours a week (I can't recall how many) practicing seat ejection…’ To me, this statement has the ring of unaltered believability about it in many ways, for it is written in what I call ‘millitary-speak’ in that he says ‘seat ejection simulator’, where civilians are more likely to say ‘ejection seat simulator’.

However, that said, the use of the word ‘simulator’ I do find slightly puzzling, and when it is linked with the second part of Mr Burton’s statement I think this could well reveal something that was previously unrealized about the XB-70 – If this statement is correct, and remember, this gentleman was there - pilots had to spend a fairly large amount of time – ‘…so many hours…’ practicing seat ejection.

Previous to this, I was under the impression that there was something that over here in the UK that given the time period would be called a ‘procedures trainer’ – in this case, a working dummy seat and capsule where a pilot could practice the procedures involved in election – or in this case encapsulation and then ejection.

This started me thinking what exactly was involved in the process, and was it of a sufficiently technical, complex nature that it needed practicing over and over again on a regular basis? I went to my copy of the XB-70 Interim Flight Manual, and straight away it revealed that ejecting from the XB-70 was a far-from-simple process:

Section 3, part 22, dated 25 June 1965 reveals all.

Crew encapsulation came in three forms, and was slightly different for AF62-001 and AF62-207. Before the Manual went into any detail there was an introductory note to the section:

‘Ballistic encapsulation can be accomplished only once. However, manual encapsulation can be accomplished as often as necessary before or after ballistic encapsulation.

MANUAL ENCAPSULATION

1. Encapsulate Order (Pilot)

Move encapsulate caution light switch to ON or use intercom to notify copilot to manually encapsulate. Watch for crew encapsulated indicator light to come on when the copilot’s capsule is closed. Receive copilot acknowledgement of the order.

If time and conditions permit:

a. Stow loose equipment.

b. Standby pitch trim arming switch – Check ARMED.

The standby pitch trim arming switch must be ARMED to ensure operation of the trim switch on the emergency descent control grip in each capsule.

c. Inlets* Engage manual control.

Inlets (Automatic AICS) **. No action required.

Bypass door switches (Standby ACIS)** Both down to OPEN as required to position shocks in the top of the crossbatch.

d. Throttles – MIL, or above.

e. Engine RPM lockup switch – RELEASE.

* = Airplane AF62-001

** = Airplane AF62-207

NOTE – Releasing engine RPM lockup provides the capability of getting rid of an engine stall when using throttle retard button on the capsule emergency descent control grip.

f. Intercom push-pull switch – pull out.

g. IFF – Check at NORM or LOW; MODE 3 selector at code 77. h. UHF – Check settings so desired communications can be maintained.

i. Pilot encapsulates first, and controls airplane unless immediate ejection is necessary.

2. Control Column – stow manually.

Press control column release pedal and push control column forward to engage the stowage detent.

3. Seat – unlock and retract.

Move seat lock release lever aft and push seat back into capsule.

4. Capsule Doors – pull close.

Pull feet into capsule and pull the door handle down sharply and forward to close and latch capsule doors. The capsule will seal automatically and, if necessary, pressurize.

BALLISTIC ENCAPSULATION

1. Encapsulate Order (Pilot)

Move encapsulate caution light switch to ON or use intercom to notify copilot to ballistically encapsulate. Watch for crew encapsulated indicator light to come on when the copilot’s capsule is closed. Receive copilot acknowledgement of the order.

2. Seat Handgrips – Pull Up.

This raises the seat handgrips, stows the control column, retracts the seat and exposes the ejection triggers.

WARNING!

• Do not touch either trigger when seat is retracted and handgrips are up, as seat is fully armed and the catapult can fire.

• Both heel pedals must be pressed back before capsule doors will close.

ENCAPSUALTED DESCENT IN THE AIRPLANE

1. Emergency descent control grip – remove from upper left survival kit and use trim button as required.

2. Throttle retard button – as required. (C and CP)

a. Pilot and Copilot must press and button momentarily and release to start movement of bypass doors and throat panels.

NOTE. When throttle retard button is used, the engine inlet bypass doors and throat panels move to a failsafe position (throat opens to 39 inches and bypass area increases to 2400 square inches). The resultant bypass door opening causes an airplane nose-up trim change. Therefore, be prepared to apply nose down trim immediately after pressing the throttle retard button.

b. Press either button in short beeps to retard RPM slowly so that large changes in airplane trim do not occur.

CAUTION

To prevent inlet unstart, RPMs must not be reduced to idle in less than 5 seconds.

NOTE

• All six engines are retarded simultaneously using the throttle retard button

• Throttle settings cannot be advanced until capsule is opened.

3. Seat handgrips – unlock and stow. Unlock and lower handgrips to the stowed position if an immediate ejection is not expected.

WARNING

Do not touch ejection triggers because the seat is fully armed and catapult could fire.

4. Decelerate and descend.

Descent at 450 knots IAS minimum to a cabin altitude of 42,000 feet. Because of the limited control available, maintain a wings-level descent.

Remember – this is only the encapsulation and ejection part of the process – manual de-encapsulation is covered in another section! Clearly the process was complex.

Mr Burton also appears to state that he was present during Al White’s de-briefing following the accident: ‘During a debriefing at the EAFB hospital, Al explained that he had encapsulated and was set to eject when he looked over to see that Cross was not properly preparing for ejection. He was pushing on the panel trying to force his seat back into the capsule which was the correct procedure in a B 58 which Cross had been flying prior to his assignment to the XB 70A. Al said that he opened his capsule and was trying to show Cross what to do when the ship went out of control.

I was fortunate to talk with Al White out at the Air Force Museum in Ohio in the 1980s and, by combining the notes from these interviews and the XB-70 Accident/Incident Report I was able to put together the following for my book. Incidentally, the XB-70 Accident/Incident Report has certain aspects to it redacted (blacked out). Nothing sinister or ‘conspiracy theory’ should be read into this; to quote the letter to me from The HQ Air Force Safety Center that was sent accompanying the accident report.

‘Portions of the safety report have been redacted (blacked out). They are not releasable for the following reasons:

a. The safety investigation board’s analysis and recommendations are exempt from disclosure under the United States Code, Title 5, Section 552(b)(5) and Department of Defense Regulation (DODR) 5400.7/Air Force Supplement C3.2.l.5. Release of this information would have a stifling effect on the deliberative process of Air Force officials.

b. The statements of any witnesses giving unswom testimony before the safety investigation board, as well as any direct or implied references to such testimony, are exempt from disclosure under the United Sates Code, Title 5, Section 552(b)(5) and Department of Defense Regulation (DODR) 5400.7/Air Force Supplement C3.2.l.5. In order to promote full disclosure, some witnesses are promised by the safety investigation board that their testimony will be used solely for mishap prevention and for no other purpose. This promise of confidentiality is made in order to encourage witnesses to disclose to the investigating board everything they know about the mishap even though the statements they make may be against their personal interest or possibly incriminating.

Pursuant to his authority, when a mishap report is deemed historical, the Air Force Chief of Safety can, under certain circumstances, release the safety board’s findings. He has done so in this case.

Now, to what appeared in my book:

Al White: ‘The airplane yawed abruptly and very violently to the right. It was so violent I thought the nose would break off. Then it was upside down and nose down, and then right side up and nose up. It did this twice and the second time around a big piece of the left wing broke off.

These were unstabilized rolls and the G forces were fierce. It was probably the Gs that finally tore the wing off after it had been weakened when Walker fell on it. The force on me was violent, throwing me ahead and to the left. I couldn't move against the Gs. But then it settled into a flat spin. This gave it a more or less fixed axis somewhere back along the fuselage and it was more stable but out of control, of course. Centrifugal force was still shoving me forward, but at least I could move a little.

When it nosed up out of the second tumble, I began trying to encapsulate'

To encapsulate and eject from an XB-70A required two conscious, deliberate actions on the part of the pilot to touch off a finely integrated sequence of events, most of them powered by explosive charges.

The first action was to pull up either or both hinged, yellow hand-grips built into the front edges of the armrests. The second action was squeeze either left or right or both triggers set into the yellow handles. This simultaneously slammed the pilot's seat back about one and a half feet deep into the upright box of the capsule and jerked his shoulder harness so rigidly tight that he can scarcely move. It also forced the aircraft’s control column forward to provide room for the capsule's clamshell doors to snap shut from top and bottom. The doors respond to an involuntary human act when, being whipped back into the capsule, the pilot's heels whack into a pair of ‘kickers’ as his legs are being doubled up into a near-fetal position.

When all this has been done, the pilot is sealed up tight in an individual metal box which carried its own life-support system.

The pulling of the triggers set off the final sequence: first the overhead hatch blew off, rapidly followed by the firing of a rocket which shot the capsule, pilot and all, 300 feet above the aircraft.

White's first action slammed him back into the capsule recess and, according to plan, jerked his shoulder harness tighter than any corset. His heels struck the door-triggering device and set off that charge. But he was immediately conscious of excruciating pain. Fighting the forces of the XB-70's spin, his right elbow had been doubled outward as he pulled the yellow handle, and now it was trapped outside the capsule at the hinge point of the clamshell doors. As a result the doors could not close shut, six inches of his own doubled elbow was outside the capsule and, with the shoulder harness straining backward, his right hand jammed against the yellow handle and the elbow locked outside, he could not get free.

‘The capsule not only had me trapped, but it hurt like hell. I was sure the arm was broken—at the minimum.’ White recalled later.

Using his left hand, White pried painfully at his right fingers, trying to work them loose from the yellow handle. They would not come free. He could have pulled the left trigger and fired his capsule out of the aircraft. But the clearance between the ejecting capsule and edge of the hatch frame was only four inches. Had he pulled the trigger, part of his elbow would have been sliced off as though by a guillotine. Spinning, in agony, and being hauled in two directions, he knew what the prospect was.

This part clearly shows that White was following/had followed the first part of the Ballistic Encapsulation part of the Flight Manual process – a process was irreversible.

‘It didn't help any that, with that crazy tumbling and the spin, I was completely disoriented. And I could see Carl Cross. His head was bobbing around as though he was working real hard at something himself. I don't know why, but I knew he hadn't begun to encapsulate because he was still forward in the thing: his seat didn't move back. That was why I could still see him out of the corner of my eye. I wanted to talk to him and tried to yell, but I guess with the pain and confusion I was only grunting.’

The doomed Valkyrie was falling fast and White, having been pulled away from the instruments, had no way of knowing how soon the XB-70A would hit. He wrestled frantically with his arm.

‘I stopped once. It sounds insane, but I debated whether to eject and cut my arm off or stay and go in with the airplane. And there was Carl to think about, even though there was no possible way I could physically help him."

These comments show a number of things – firstly, Cross had not begun the encapsulation process, and secondly Al White knew there was no way he could help him. Mr Burton’s statement of ‘ Al said that he opened his capsule and was trying to show Cross what to do when the ship went out of control…’ is seemingly at odds which what Al White told me and the Accident Investigation team, and is also at odds with what was and what not possible in the Aircraft’s Flight Manual.

One only has to look at the illustrations at the end of this report to see how little visibility and movement Al White had. To continue with the story:

Then White's left hand worked one right finger free, then another, then all of them and he pulled the now unlocked hand away from the yellow handle. In agony, he finally dragged the wounded arm and elbow inside with him. White said that it seemed as if minutes passed while he wrestled with the arm, but actually just about 86 seconds elapsed between the time the XB- 70 began toppling out of control and his chute blossomed.

"Once that arm was in I didn't waste any time, I didn't know where we were or how close to going in.  I pulled the trigger, the rocket fired and I went out with the capsule doors still open. The shot gave my head a hell of a jerk on top of the snap in the neck I'd got when the seat went back."

The capsule doors were still open when he ejected. Since he was now well below 15,000 feet, his chute opened almost immediately.  A new peril was immediate - the spinning XB-70A swung past what seemed like only inches from his capsule.

‘That long nose went by and I thought God, the next time that big bastard comes around it's going to get me. At that point the airplane and I must have been falling at the same speed. It scared me."

The capsule doors were still wide open and White wanted them closed. Although the charge which should have closed them was gone they could be closed manually by pulling a handle on the upper door.

White wanted them closed for two reasons. He felt exposed with only the nylon straps of his harness between him and the void. The second reason was more imperative: his trapped arm had interrupted one more vital event in the escape sequence. At that altitude an XB-70A capsule, weighing with pilot approximately 800 pounds, falls fast even with its parachute open - 32 feet per second compared to the approximate 22 fps of a man with an ordinary  parachute. To absorb the shock of landing, a pneumatic cushion  - called the ‘attenuator bag’ - should have inflated automatically as the main chute deployed. But it had not done so because the bag could not inflate with the lower door open and swung down against it. Al wanted the door closed so he could inflate the bag with a manual backup system.

'I didn't want to hit without that bladder blown up. The engineers had calculated that to land without the bag might cost a man a broken back. But it didn't work. Even after I got the doors closed I couldn't find it. I was still disoriented and concerned about a lot of things: Carl, whether he was out: the junk falling around me: and a terrible coldness. Shock, I guess - that on top of the sweat from working to free my arm.

Then I heard the XB-70A hit. It made a terrible explosion and an enormous plume of smoke came up.

Cotton watched the descending parachute and thought for a time that White would fall into the XB-70's pyre. But then he saw that an easterly wind would carry the capsule clear.

At five minutes and 22 seconds after the accident and  four minutes and 11 seconds behind his dead aircraft. White's capsule was about to hit.

The wreck site was a few miles north of Barstow, California.  Major Cross's body was found in the XB-70A with his seat still forward in the ejection capsule. He may never have been able to begin the escape sequence, perhaps because of the same violent forces which had nearly killed Al White.

Conclusion

So, that is the new evidence married to what was already known. In my opinion Mr Burton has added new information into the background, especially to the revelations relating to the seat ejection simulator.

Mr Burton’s comments ‘According to the log book, Major Cross had initialed the required practice time. However, the simulation crew told us that he never got in the seat   he just came, initialed the log book, and left’ is, from all accounts available to me unsubstantiated and unproven.  I will leave the reader to draw their own conclusions.

Graham M Simons

May be used without charge, as long as due credit is given.

gmsimons@btconnect.com

4^th April 2015